We present a new method for solving equilibrium problems, where the underlying function is continuous and satisfies a pseudomonotone assumption. First, we construct an appropriate hyperplane which separates the current iterative point from the solution set. Then the next iterate is obtained as the projection of the current iterate onto the intersection of the feasible set with the half-space containing the solution set. We also analyze the global convergence of the method under minimal assumptions. MSC: 65K10; 90C25
Introduction
The typical form of equilibrium problems is formulated by the Ky Fan inequality as follows (see [] ):
Find x * ∈ C such that f x * , y ≥  for all y ∈ C, where C is a nonempty closed convex subset of R n and f : C × C → R is a bifunction such that f (x, x) =  for all x ∈ C, shortly EP(f , C). In this paper, we suppose that f (x, ·) is convex on C for all x ∈ C, f is continuous on C × C and the solution set S of EP(f , C) is nonempty. Although EP(f , C) has a simple formulation, it includes many important problems in applied mathematics such as variational inequalities, complementarity problems, (vector) optimization problems, fixed point problems and saddle point problems (see [-] ). In recent years, equilibrium problems have become an attractive field for many researchers in both theory and applications (see [-] ). There is a myriad of literature related to equilibrium problems and their applications in electricity market, transportation, economics and network [, ] .
Theory of equilibrium problems has been studied extensively and intensively in terms of the existence of solutions and generalizations to many abstract ways. However, methods for solving EP(f , C) are still limited and have not satisfied the need of applications. There are popular approaches to solving EP(f , C) to our knowledge. The first approach is based on the gap function (see [] ), the second way is to use the proximal point method [] and http://www.journalofinequalitiesandapplications.com/content/2012/1/288 the third one is the auxiliary subproblem principle [] . Recently, basing on the fixed point property that x * ∈ C is a solution to EP(f , If y k = x k , then STOP.
Otherwise, find the smallest nonnegative integer m such that
and compute
By replacing a quadratic term y -x *  in the subproblem (.) by the Bregman distance function, Nguyen et al. in [] proposed the interior proximal extragradient method for solving EP(f , C), where f is pseudomonotone and C only is a polyhedron convex set. The method has also been extensively studied to solve EP(f , C) and variational inequalities (see [-] ). A special case of Problem EP(f , C) is the variational inequality problem, shortly VI(F, C), which is to find a point x * ∈ C such that
where C is a nonempty closed convex subset of R n and F : C → C. A typical method to solve Problem VI(F, C) is the projection method, which is based on the property that x is a solution to Problem VI(F, C) if and only if it coincides with zeros of the projected resid-
, where Pr C (·) is the metric projection on C. Solodov and Svaiter in [] proposed a projection method which starts with a point x  ∈ C and generates a sequence {x
where
(.) http://www.journalofinequalitiesandapplications.com/content/2012/1/288
Under pseudomonotone and continuous assumptions of F, the authors showed that the sequences globally converge to a solution of the variational inequality problem VI(F, C). Note that if r(x k ) = , then x k is a solution to the problem.
In this paper, by combining the extragradient methods in [] and Armijo-type linesearch techniques in (.), we propose a new method for solving Problem EP(f , C), which is called to be cutting hyperplane method. First, we construct an appropriate hyperplane which separates the current iterative point from the solution set. Next, we combine this technique with Armijo-type linesearch techniques to obtain a convergent iteration scheme for pseudomonotone equilibrium problems. Then, the next iterate is obtained as the projection of the current iterate onto the intersection of the feasible set with the half-space containing the solution set. Compared with the extragradient method in [] and the current methods, our iteration method is quite simple. The fundamental difference here is that the global convergence of the method only requires the continuity and pseudomonotonicity of the bifunction f . Moreover, we also show that the cluster point of the sequence in our scheme is the limit of the projection of the iteration point onto the solution set of Problem EP(f , C).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section , we give formal definitions of our target EP(f , C) and the pseudomonotonicity of f . We then propose the cutting hyperplane method. Section  is devoted to the proof of its global convergence to a solution of EP(f , C). In the last section, we apply the method for oligopolistic equilibrium market models with concave cost functions and a generalized form of the bifunction defined by the Cournot-Nash equilibrium model considered in [, -].
Proposed method
Suppose that C ⊆ R n , f : C × C → R ∪ {+∞} is a bifunction. We first recall the following definitions that will be required in our analysis of equilibrium problems (see [, ] ).
Definition . A bifunction f is said to be (a) strongly monotone on C if there exists a constant ρ >  such that
If f is a mapping defined by
can be formulated as the multivalued variational inequality (shortly, MVI): http://www.journalofinequalitiesandapplications.com/content/2012/1/288
In this case, it is known that solutions coincide with zeros of the following projected residual function:
where λ >  and w ∈ F(x). In other words, with
Applying this idea to the equilibrium problems EP(f , C), we obtain the following solution scheme. Let x k be a current approximation to the solution of EP(f , C). First, we compute
Otherwise, we search the line segment between x k and y k for a point (w k , z k ) such that the hyperplane
strictly separates x k from the solution set S of EP(f , C). To find such z k , we may use a computationally inexpensive Armijo-type procedure in [] . We find the smallest nonnegative number m k such that
Then we compute the next iterate x k+ by projecting x k onto the intersection of the feasible set C with the half-space
This means that
Convergence
Instead of (.), Tran et al. in [] used a linesearch technique as follows:
where α ∈ (, ), ρ >  and G : 
Proof For r(x k ) =  and γ ∈ (, ), we suppose to obtain a contradiction that for every nonnegative integer m, we have
Passing to the limit in the above inequality, as m → ∞, by continuity of f (·, y k ), we obtain
On the other hand, since y k is a solution to the convex optimization problem
we have
With y = x k , the last inequality implies
Combining (.) with (.), we obtain
Hence, it must be either r(
. The first case contradicts r(x k ) = , while the second one contradicts the fact that σ < β  .
Lemma . (see []) Let C be a nonempty closed convex subset of a real Hilbert space H.
Suppose that, for all u ∈ C, the sequence {x k } satisfies
Then the sequence {Pr C (x k )} converges strongly to some x * ∈ C.
Let us discuss the global convergence of Scheme (.)-(.).
Lemma . Let {x k } be the sequence generated by Scheme (.)-(.). Then the following hold:
Proof (i) For a proof of this, see Lemma . in [] and Theorem .
Combining this inequality with (.) andw
(iii) Suppose x * ∈ S. Then f (x * , x) ≥  for all x ∈ C, and since f is pseudomonotone on C,
From this inequality and (.), it follows that
In particular, for y = x k+ , we easily deduce that the correspondingx = x k+ ∈ C ∩ ∂H k and thus that x k+ = Pr C∩∂H k (x k ). Therefore, for every
. Also, we have
Since x k+ = Pr C∩H k (x k ), using the Pythagorean theorem, we can reduce that
From (.) and (.), we have
which means
Using Lemma ., we can prove the global convergence of Scheme (.)-(.) under moderate assumptions.
Theorem . Let f be pseudomonotone and ∂f (x, ·)(x) be bounded on C. Then Proof We first show that the sequence {x k } is bounded. Since
which implies that
Hence, we have
(.) http://www.journalofinequalitiesandapplications.com/content/2012/1/288
Replacing y by y k and combining with assumptions f (z k , z k ) =  and
Combining this inequality with (.) and the assumption γ ∈ (, ), we obtain
Hence, (.) reduces to
Combining (.) with (.), we obtain
This implies that the sequence { x k -x * } is nonincreasing and hence convergent. So, there exists a subsequence {x k j } which converges tox. We consider the function g(y) :=
, where δ C (·) is the indicator function on C. Then g is the strongly convex function on C and hence ∂g is strongly monotone with a constant β > . By the definition of a strongly monotone mapping, we have
By the assumption that ∂f (x, ·)(x) is upper semicontinuous on C and {x k j } converges tō
x, the sequence {g This together with (.) implies 
Passing to the limit in (.) as j → ∞, and using the continuity of f , lim j→∞ x k j =x,
where r(x) =x -ȳ. From Scheme (.)-(.), we have
Since f is continuous, passing to the limit as j → ∞, we obtain
Combining this with (.), we have
which implies r(x) = , and hencex ∈ S. Letting x * =x and repeating the previous arguments, we conclude that the whole sequence {x k } converges tox ∈ S. This completes the proof. 
Corollary . Under assumptions of Theorem
It follows from Theorem . that
Then, by Lemma ., we have
Passing the limit in (.) and combining this with (.), we have
This means that x * = x  and
Illustrative examples and numerical results
As an example for equilibrium problems EP(f , C), we consider the Cournot-Nash oligopolistic market equilibrium model (see [, , ]). In this model, it is assumed that there are n-firms producing a common homogenous commodity and that the price p i of the firm i depends on the total quantity σ x = n i= x i of the commodity. Let h i (x i ) denote the cost of the firm i when its production level is x i . Suppose that the profit of the firm i is given by
where h i is the cost function of the firm i that is assumed to be dependent only on its production level.
. . , n) denote the strategy set of the firm i. Each firm seeks to maximize its own profit by choosing the corresponding production level under the presumption that the production of other firms is parametric input. In this context, a Nash equilibrium is a production pattern in which no firm can increase its profit by changing its controlled variables. Thus, under this equilibrium concept, each firm determines its best response given other firms' actions. Mathematically, a point x * = (x *  , . . . , x * n ) ∈ C := C  × · · · × C n is said to be a Nash equilibrium point if
When h i is affine, this market problem can be formulated as a special Nash equilibrium problem in the n-person noncooperative game theory. http://www.journalofinequalitiesandapplications.com/content/2012/1/288
Then it has been proved in [] that the problem of finding an equilibrium point of this model can be formulated as the following equilibrium problem in the sense of Blum and Oettli:
Find x ∈ C such that: f x * , y ≥  for all y ∈ C.
In classical Cournot-Nash models (see [] ), the price and cost functions for each firm are assumed to be affine of the following forms:
Combining this with (.), (.), (.) and (.), we obtain that
It follows from Definition . that the following result holds. Now we consider a generalized form of the bifunction defined by the above CournotNash equilibrium model. Let C be a polyhedral convex set given by
is convex for each fixed x ∈ C and continuous on C. The function defined by (.) also is a generalized form of the bifunction defined by the Cournot-Nash equilibrium model considered in [] . By using Definition ., it is easy to have the following property of f . y)F(y, x) for all x, y ∈ C, then the function f defined by (.) is pseudomonotone and it can be not monotone on C × C.
Proposition . If there exists a bifunction
To illustrate our scheme, we consider two academic numerical tests of the function f (x, y) .
In this case, the bifunction f defined in (.) is pseudomonotone, continuous and differentiable on C. The subproblem needed to solve at Step  is of the strongly convex quadratic programming In Table , T . This example is given by Bnouhachem (see [] ). Under these assumptions, it can be proved that f is continuous and pseudomonotone on C.
We also see that in
Step  the solution y k can be written by 
Thus, the sequence {w k } is uniform bounded. There have been some changes in this case: Table  . We perform Scheme (.)-(.) and Algorithm a [] in Matlab Ra running on a PC Desktop Intel(R) Core(TM) Duo CPU T@ .GHz . GB, Gb RAM.
